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Insurance, Terrorism, and 9/11
Robert H. Jerry, II
or most of us, the collapse of the World
'ia e Center towers exists at the outermost
Sedge of human comprehension. Even after
one visits Ground Zero, the events of 9/11
retain a surreal quality, invoking feelings
beyond words as one tries to contemplate
losses immeasurable with numbers.
Indeed, the insurance losses are insignificant when compared to the human
tragedies caused by the terrorist
attacks-and in insurance
terms, we witnessed
the most costly,
complex events
to transpire

in a single day in the history of the planet.
Of course, the destruction of the World
Trade Center was completely unexpected.
Hindsight always sharpens ones vision,
but we understood before 9/11 that a terrorism event of this magnitude was possible. The satin nerve gas attack in a Tokyo
subway in 1995 killed twelve and injured
more than 5,500; had this attack been carried out more skillfully, more than
W5,500
easily could have died.
Timothy McVeigh was an
amateur using a crude
device; as horrific as
continued on page 6
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he tragic events of September 11, 2001, have dramatically affected the lives of everyone
who lives in the United States or does business here. The effects go far beyond the immediate losses we suffered as a direct result of the attacks. We now live with a constant awareness
of a terrorist threat. We do not know if or when another attack will take place, but we no
longer assume that it will not take place on our soil. We have watched as a major city
ceases all regular business to clean up the rubble from fallen skyscrapers. Many people have
been directly affected by biological chemical attacks that caused the closure of entire buildings-even government buildings. And many people have been evacuated from their offices
while bomb threats are investigated.
It is widely accepted that the terrorist attacks and various threats of attack that took place
in 2001 and 2002 will also affect the insurance industry as it has many other areas of our
lives and businesses. Almost all insurers have raised premiums on virtually all lines of corncontinued on page 4
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the Oklahoma City bombing was, it could have been much worse. The Olympic Park
bombing, the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, and the various IRA bombings in
the United Kingdom are just a few reasons that on 9/10, the possibility that terrorism could
wreak extraordinary damage in an urban center was not beyond our imagination. On 9/12,
the world was not that much different, except with the important qualification that a major
loss with wrenching consequences had occurred.
Economic losses in New York City are forecast to be at least $83 billion and perhaps $97
billion; most estimates predict that $40 billion to $50 billion of these losses will be insured.
Because the magnitude of the loss that occurred on 9/11 was unprecedented, it was tempting to view both the event and the terrorism risk as sui generis.
But catastrophic loss is not new to the insurance industry and
terrorism arguably stands as simply another kind of catastrophe,
a peril neither quantitatively nor qualitatively different from various kinds of natural disasters. Hurricanes, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, tsunamis, and even asteroid impacts all carry
with them the possibility of insured losses in the tens or even
hundreds of billions of dollars. During the last 20 years, the
extremely rapid pace of coastal development has greatly
increased the loss exposure in prime hurricane territory Until
9/11, the largest disaster was Hurricane Andrew, which caused
approximately $16 billion in losses, a number that would have
increased three to four times if the hurricane had made a direct
hit on the Miami metropolitan area. It seems obvious enough that eventually a large hurricane will hit Miami or New Orleans head-on and cause property damage greatly exceeding
that which occurred in New York City on 9/11. A 1995 study estimated that if an earthquake similar to the 1906 San Francisco quake were to occur today, fatalities could reach
8,000, and total damages could reach $225 billion, a sum nearly three times all economic
loss suffered in New York City on 9/11.
When Mount St. Helens lost approximately 1,100 feet of its height and destroyed a few
hundred homes in a rather remote area of Oregon in 1980, we began to pay more attention to the active volcanic range that runs along most of the west coast of the United States.
Scientists now know that past eruptions in the Cascade range were far more violent than
the Mount St. Helens eruption. The eruption (and destruction) of Mount Mazama about

7,700 years ago was 50 times more powerful than Mount St. Helens; what is left of this
mountain is now Crater Lake in Oregon, the seventh deepest lake in the world in a crater
six miles across. There are 65 active volcanoes in the United States--more than any other
country except Japan and Indonesia-and many are overdue for an eruption. Washingtons
Mount Rainier, the tallest mountain in the Cascade range, is a particularly dangerous peak.
Mudflows from Mount Rainiers past eruptions have flowed into the Puget Sound seven
times in the last 6,000 years, and about 100,000 people now live in cities built on areas that
have been buried in past mudflows. When Mount Rainier awakens from its temporary
slumber, the consequences to the northwestern United States will be devastating. Thus, one
cannot argue that the terrorism risk merits special treatment because terrorism losses are
large and uninsurable. Both terrorism and natural disaster losses can be "mega-catastrophic"
where private risk-spreading mechanisms are irrelevant and government institutions
become the means of repairing loss and spreading the risk of future losses. The 9/11 losses
are the largest in history, but they do not reach that level.
Indeed, the insurance industry has successfully absorbed the effects of 9/11. Terrorism
coverage, although more expensive, has generally been available since 9/11; businesses are
not always pleased with its price, but these increases were for many firms no greater than
what had occurred in other insurance cycles. Although coverage disappeared for some businesses (which is what happened during the 1980s pollution coverage "crisis" and in the
wake of Hurricane Andrew), the market did not collapse. Transitory capacity problems in
insurance are not uncommon, and these problems are generally self-correcting.
Thus, if one agrees that 9/11 defines the upper boundary of potential terrorism losses in
the United States, we might confidently conclude that the insurance world did not change
appreciably on 9/11. The problem, however, is that we are not, and cannot be, certain that
the upper boundary has been reached, and we are uncertain about where the mean now
rests in the distribution of terrorism losses. Indeed, one lesson of 9/11 is that the mean with
respect to terrorism losses is not where we previously thought it rested. Plus, there are
important differences between natural catastrophes and terrorism events. The frequency of
earthquakes and hurricanes can be estimated by scientists based on past experience and
sophisticated predictive models. In contrast, terrorism involves human-caused losses, the
timing, severity, and frequency of which are not subject to reliable prediction. Massive terrorism losses could occur, for example, in close succession temporally; a series of catastrophes, no one of which in isolation outstrips the insurance industrys capacity, could cumulatively constitute a mega-catastrophe. Past experience strongly suggests that this is highly
unlikely to occur with respect to natural disasters, but intuitively such a conclusion seems
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less reliable with respect to terrorism. Moreover, unlike the human actors in terrorism
events, natural catastrophes do not self-select their targets or self-calibrate their destructive
force.
Thus, the question whether 9/11 has changed the insurance world cannot be answered
simply In some respects, nothing is different, but it is difficult to be sanguine about this
assessment. Terrorism is less predictable in terms of magnitude and frequency of loss, and
this raises doubts about the capacity of the industry with respect to future events. Until
the uncertainty with respect to the terrorism risk abates and markets stabilize, problems
of cost and availability will persist. This, of course, has been true in other insurance sectors in the past, and temporary dislocations do not necessarily justify government intervention. If, however, terrorism is different enough to prevent the market from developing
affordable, available coverage, then a government role is appropriate.
The tasks of reallocating risk and serving as the insurer of last
resort are hardly foreign to the federal government. One way the
government could become involved in providing terrorism coverage is by directly providing insurance and totally displacing
private markets. This would be similar to the government pro
gram that protected property owners from loss from enemy
attack during World War II. This approach has not received serious consideration for the present situation. An approach to be
taken more seriously would have the federal government create
a reinsurance company that would provide coverage for terrorism risk. Private insurers would be compelled to participate in
the funding of this company, which would have the effect of
pooling the industrys risk while capping industry losses
through a government backstop. This approach would be similar to that now followed in the United Kingdom. Another option would have the federal
government share the risk along with private entities. For example, a large deductible
would be set for insurer contributions to terrorism losses beyond which the federal government assumes all risk. This approach is potentially problematic because the govemment is responsible for 100 percent of all losses above a certain level, and insurers and risk
managers have little incentive to constrain losses once they surpass the deductible. Thus,
the challenge of crafting this approach involves designing a system that requires insurer
participation in bearing an appropriate share of the risk and in compensating loss without
placing disincentives on the creation of coverage. This approach is advantageous because
it can be adjusted or dismantled as private markets improve their ability to underwrite terrorism coverage and manage terrorism risk. This, in general terms, is the approach ltkely
to emerge from ongoing efforts in Congress to create a federal backstop.
Private markets have demonstrated resiliency in the aftermath of 9/11, and capacity
will continue to improve, but if the industry had been required to digest a second 9/11type event, the industrys weakened condition would have produced a much different scenario. Moreover, there looms the possibility of a mega-catastrophe--or a series of smaller
events in close succession that have the cumulative impact of a mega-catastrophe-that
would overwhelm the industry All of this suggests the desirability of a limited role for the
federal government: helping underwrite the portion of the terrorism risk that is beyond
the industrys capacity while leaving plenty of room for private markets to function and to
develop capacity for smaller losses. This kind of limited backstop would cap the industrys losses, thereby making explicit what is already the commonly assumed, unstated
premise: If a mega-catastrophe were to occur, the government would provide disaster
assistance ex poste. By making the informal understanding explicit ex ante, the federal government could play a useful role in facilitating a market for affordable coverage. -0,
Robert H. Jerry II, is the Floyd R Gibson Missouri Endowed Professor University of MissouriColumbia School of Law. The author'smore detailed discussion of this topic will appearin aforthcoming issue of the Connecticut Insurance Law Journal.
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problem behaviors, as well as generating the desired solutions to those problems.
The Result: Identifying and eliminatingblocks or obstacles that limit yourfirm's performance.
An executive coach helps you to stop tolerating behaviors and begin improving the work
environment.
When considering an executive coach, finding the proper fit is essential. Attorneys generally have different career goals than do CEOs or other corporate professionals. Be sure to
talk to prospective coaches about their practice, their clientele, and how you can meet your
own goals as an attorney Robin Hensley is an executive coach andfounder of PersonalConstruction LLC in Atlanta. She
can be reached at rhensley@personalconstruction.com.

